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DURING the formative period of most of the current doctrines of
negligence law, liability in tort was looked on as shifting a loss that
had already occurred from one individual to another-generally from
the person who suffered the loss to the person who caused it. It is
against the background of this way of looking at things that nearly all
of our conventional reasoning about the objectives of tort law has de-
veloped and that nearly all of our conclusions have been drawn and our
rules formulated. But society has no interest in the mere shifting of a loss
between individuals just for thte sake of shifting it. The loss, by hypoth-
esis, has already happened. A has been killed, or his leg broken or his
automobile smashed up. If the only question is whether B shall be
made to pay for this loss, any good that may come to society from
having compensation made to one of its members is exactly offset by
the harm caused by taking that amount away from another of its mem-
bers. In that view of the problem there had to be some additional rea-
son for a defendant to compensate a plaintiff for his injury before soci-
ety would compel compensation. These reasons might be (a) a feeling
of what is fair or just; (b) a desire to discourage dangerous conduct, or
of course a combination of both.
To a very considerable extent this last-named desire was tempered
by a strong counter-desire not unduly to discourage enterprising affirm-
ative activity-even when it was dangerous-because people were very
much imbued with the idea that unfettered enterprise and activity in
nearly all directions worked out through the laws of competition to
promote the general good. And again, these matters of fairness and
deterrence were all considered on the assumptions that plaintiff and
defendant were alone involved and that what happened between them
was the real issue-that tort liability was paid for out of the defendant's
own pocketbook. This focussed attention on the moral quality of the
conduct of the individual participants in the accident. The net result
was the general principle of no liability without fault.
There is however an altogether different approach to tort law. Hu-
man failures in a machine age cause a large and fairly regular-though
probably reducible-toll of life, limb, and property. As a class the
victims of these accidents can ill afford the loss they entail. The prob-
lem of decreasing this toll can best be solved through the pressure of
safety regulations with penal and licensing sanctions, and of self-inter-
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est in avoiding the host of non-legal disadvantages that flow from ac-
cidents. But when this is all done, human losses remain, It is the
principal job of tort law today to deal with these losses. The best and
most efficient way to do this is to assure accident victims of compensa-
tion, and to distribute the losses involved over society as a whole or
some very large segment of it. Such a basis for administering losses
may be called social insurance.
This at once brings in an important new element. For while no social
good may come from the mere shifting of a loss, society does benefit
from the wide and regular distribution of losses, taken alone.' The
administration of losses in this way may entirely change evaluations
of what is fair. If a certain type of loss is the more or less inevitable
by-product of a desirable but dangerous form of activity it may well
be just to distribute such losses among all the beneficiaries of the ac-
tivity though it would be unjust to visit them severally upon those
individuals who had happened to be the faultless instruments causing
them .2
What I have termed the principle of social insurance has been openly
accepted in one important branch of what used to be tort law-the
field of industrial accident. For the rest, the older principles of tort
1. This comes about in the following ways:
(a) from the point of view of the individuals engaged in the activity which causes the loss,
a certain, calculable, and reasonable cost is substituted for the chance of ruinous loss
through liability. This removes a detriment to engaging in useful but dangerous activity.
See WILzETr, THE EcoNoMIc THEORY OF RisK AND INSURANCE 107 et seq. (1901) ; Kuir,
CASUALTY INSURANCE 13-4 (1928).
(b) The victim, too, is protected from the risk of financial ruin or great financial shock.
This is a direct benefit to society since the social good includes the sum of the good accru-
ing to individuals. And it also benefits society indirectly by protecting it from the re-
percussions of individual ruin which are broader and more extreme than the direct loss.
See REPORT BY COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 56, 66,
219, 220 (Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, 1932) (here-
inafter Teferred to as COLUMBIA REPORT); 6 PUmacATIONS or NEW YORIC STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ComMITTrE 580 et seq. (1938); Corstvet, The Uncom-
pensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 466 (1936) ; Douglas,
Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal Control, 42 YALE L. J. 591, 607 (1933);
Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329, 340 (1932).
(c) Even where individual ruin and its wider consequences are not threatened, the equi-
table and wide distribution of a loss is all to the good, for a man's bottom dollar is his
most valuable dollar, and each dollar added to that has a decreasing value to him. So that
if a loss equals 100, less social disutility will result from letting one unit of it fall on each
of 100 people than from putting it all on one person. For a fairly simple exposition of
the concept of marginal utility, see WICKSELL, LECTURES ON POLITICAL EcoNOMY 29
et seq. (1934).
2. Surely there is here at least as much of a moral point of view as in the ',fault"
basis of liability, "but it is social morality, and not personal blame which is involved."
PROSSER, TORTS 21 (1941); Pound, The End of Law as Developed it; Legal Rles
and Doctrines, 27 HARv. L. REV. 195, 233 (1914). See James, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1158 (1941).
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liability based on fault remain on the surface and, as they are reflected
in legal reasoning, remain pretty much the same although there have
been peripheral extensions.3 But this lack of formal change in the main
body of accident law is really misleading. Great changes are going on
under the surface which have profoundly affected the operation and
incidence of tort liability and the assurance of compensation.
Chief among the factors which have brought about this change is
the prevalence of liability insurance--a device which was unknom
until practically the end of the last century.4 Legally, liability insur-
ance was at first (and still largely is) regarded as an altogether irrele-
vant fact in the consideration of tort liability. It was a private contract
of indemnity between the defendant and an outsider, by which the
latter undertook to protect the insured from loss on account of his in-
dividual legal liability. As to the injured person it was res inter alios
acta-or as the non-classically trained layman would put it, "none of
his business." But whatever the orthodox legal notion, the fact of
widely held insurance and the form and development of insurance pol-
icies and insurance practices have very greatly changed the way tort
law actually works. 'What these things have done, in effect, is to intro-
duce into our present system some of the aspects of a scheme of social
insurance. This article will try to trace out and evaluate some of the
ways in which this has happened. First we shall examine how liability
insurance affects the incidence and distribution of loss under some of
the existing rules of tort law; next we shall try to explore how the ide-
spread holding of such insurance affects the matter of accident preven-
tion; then we shall see how insurance policy developments have in-
creased the assurance of compensation and have even modified some
of the rules of liability. Finally we shall inquire into the way insurance
company settlement practices affect the question of compensating the
victims of today's accidents.
II
Of prime importance is the fact that wherever there is widely held
insurance, tort liability no longer merely shifts a loss from one individ-
ual to another but it tends to distribute the loss according to the prin-
ciples of insurance, and the person nominally liable is often only a con-
duit through whom this process of distribution starts to flow. This
3. Such as the increasing tendency towards allowing recovery for pre-natal in-
juries, Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), 32 VA. L. REv. 1203, 32 Cor.
L. Q. 609 (1947), and the growing liberality towards cases where there has been injury
through fright or shock without impact. See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal
Damage, 20 MicH. L. REv. 497 (1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in
the Law of Torts, 49 Hagv. L. REV. 1033 (1936) ; and for an extreme case, Rasmussen v.
Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 NAV. 890 (1938), 48 Y.LE L. J. 303.
4. CROBAUGH & REDDING, CASUALTY INSURANCE 395 (1928); McNeely, ll[egality
as a Factor in Insurance, 41 CoL. L. REv. 26, 28 (1941).
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does not at all mean that the loss disappears and does not have to be
paid for. But it does mean that you ought to know who is paying for
it, and in what proportions, before you can really see and evaluate
what is going on even in terms of the fault principle. And it does mean
that when courts talk and reason about a rule of law as though the
judgment were to come out of the defendant's pocket, they are often
thinking in terms of complete unreality. Further, this fact of insurance
does mean that some of the benefits and values of social insurance are
actually attained under our present system, and it opens up possibil-
ities for their further pursuit to the extent that this is thought desirable.
Surely at the very least it invites an appraisal of existing or proposed
rules of law in terms of how they serve the possible objectives of social
insurance as well as how they serve the fault principle. Such an ap-
praisal, in turn, calls for a study which observes and traces out the way
losses are paid and distributed in actual operation.
In many situations this study will reveal problems which are fairly
simple to state. Any rule of law, for instance, which tends effectively
to impose stricter liability on the insured motorist, or cuts down his
defenses, permits some of the benefits of social insurance in the case
of just so many more claims.5 The extra cost of paying these claims
will not all be cast on the individuals who nominally incur them, but
will be distributed over the whole group of policy holders carrying
insurance on this type of risk. The questions then are: how much this
extra cost will add to the premiums and whether on a balancing of this
and other pertinent factors it is desirable or just to impose and distrib-
ute the extra cost in this way. Very few studies have been made of
the cost in premium rates of a rule of law.6 Nor would an accurate
study along this line be easy. The insurance companies themselves do
not even try to find out what part of their losses is attributable to any
given legal doctrine. Rates for a locality are computed on the basis
of gross losses paid, and a multitude of factors (many of them non-
legal) go into making this a relatively high or low sum.7 But while
5. Other examples are the rules imposing strict liability for harm caused by some
kinds of extra-hazardous activities, such as blasting; and rules like rcs ipsa Ioquitur
which throw the burden of injury from unexplained accidents on those whose activities
cause them.
6. In an interesting article reappraising the Missouri humanitarian rule in the
light of present conditions, the differentials between automobile liability insurance rates in
Missouri and some surrounding states are set out. McCleary, Bases of the Humanitarian
Doctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo. L. IRv. 56, 87 (1940). These show that the Missouri rates
are high, but it would be hard indeed to demonstrate just how much of this (if any) is
attributable to the humanitarian doctrine.
7. Some of these are the tendency of local juries to give high verdicts (or low ones,
as the case may be) ; the extent to which ambulance chasing is organized; the extent to
which the general population is "claim wise"; and the general standard of living in the com-
munity. For a suggestion of some non-legal factors causing the current pressure towards
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there is a painful lack of data for accurately measuring the money cost
of a rule imposing stricter liability, a truer and more useful appraisal
of the interests and policies involved in a decision will result from think-
ing through its implications in terms of distribution of losses through
insurance 8 rather than proceeding on the false and misleading assump-
tion that the individual defendant pays the damages, when in so many
cases he does not.
A specific situation of this kind where, in hard fact, the insurance
factor is really the dominant one, yet where most (though not all) of the
judicial reasoning ignores this factor and turns on considerations which
the fact of insurance has really made quite irrelevant, is the field of
intra-family suits for negligence. Recovery by the unemancipated mi-
nor child against his parent is almost uniformly denied for a variety
of reasons which involve the integrity of the family unit and the family
exchequer and the importance of parental discipline.9 But in truth,
virtually no such suits are brought except where there is insurance. And
where there is, none of these threats to the family exists at all. Other
problems, to be sure, are raised, such as the very great ease of a dis-
honest but concerted assault by the family against the insurance com-
pany. And of course there is the deeper question whether such losses
should be borne by the individuals suffering them (who happen to stand
in close family relationship to the "wrongdoer,") or whether they should
be distributed over the motoring public. But the conventional way of
talking about the matter tends only to conceal these real problems and
prevent intelligent consideration of them. All this has been ably pointed
higher rates, see 47 BEST's INSURANCE NEWS (Fire & Cas. ed.) No. 11, p. 17 (1947) (here-inafter cited as BEsT's). Cf. Dowvns, Compulsory Insurance, 40 BEsT's No. 7, p. 21, 2x
(1939) ; 48 BEsT's No. 3, p. 54 (1947).
8. A fairly early example of clear judicial thinking along this line is Martin
v. New York & N.E.R. Co., 62 Conn. 331, 25 A. 239 (1S92). More recent examples are
to be found in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal2d 453, 461, 150 P2d 436, 440
(1944) (concurring opinion of Traynor, J.) ; Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N.E.2d
139 (1945) ; President & Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 823, 824
(1942). The last two opinions cited treat the problem of immunity for charitable institu-
tions where there is liability insurance. They come to opposite conclusions, but in each
case the real problem is more clearly seen because it is thought of in the vay here con-
tended for. Cf. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P2d
835 (1939), 53 HAv. L. Rzv. 873 (1940), where the court appreciates the fact of insur-
ance but ignores the probable effect of liability in the higher cost of insurance protection
to charities.
9. A good example of this kind of thing is the majority opinion in Small v. Morrison,
185 N. C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923). An even more shocking decision is Lasecki v. Kabara,
235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940). Here both parents were dead and their insurance
carrier was made a party defendant as the Wisconsin practice allows, yet recovery by
the children was denied. In Louisiana, however, the plaintiff's ability to proceed directly
against the insurer has led its courts to look at fact rather than myth. Edwards v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935). See Moore, Delcnses Available to the
Landlord's Ingsurer under Act 174 of 1932, 21 Tu.AxE L. R-v. 596 (1947).
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out in law review comment 10 and in a thoughtfully realistic opinion
of the New Hampshire court," but such instances are rare, at least as
far as judicial treatment of the problem goes.
There are other situations in the field of torts where the indirect, but
vital, effect of insurance has not, so far as I know, been much noticed
or traced out. A great deal has been written by commentators, 2 for
example, and some by courts 13 about the proper standard of conduct
to be applied to infants when they are sued as defendants. There is
respectable authority that they should not be held to the standard
required of the reasonably prudent adult but that allowance should
be made for their immaturity. 14 If the assumption is that infants have
to pay the damages assessed against them, this view is.quite defensible.
In the first place, it obviously is a further refinement and individualiza-
tion of the fault principle because it tends more closely to make legal
fault coincide with moral fault. And again, if we proceed on this same
assumption, there would be some strong practical arguments against
overburdening the development and learning of skills which ought to
be encouraged in the young. But what would happen to these argu-
ments if the assumption proved false-if infants do not have to pay
damages assessed against them? 1 A great deal of evidence points
strongly to the conclusion that they do not. Till well along in the pres-
ent century there was an almost complete dearth of actual judicial
10. McCurdy, Torts Between People in Donestic Relaions, 43 HAv. L. Rnv. 1030
(1930).
11. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930). A similar decision is Lusk
v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
12. Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 Mxcn. L. Ray, (1924);
Shulman, Standard of Care for Children, 37 YAIE L. J. 618 (1928); H aRDER, LAW OF
TORTS § 282 (1933) ; PaossER, TORTS 229 et seq., 1086 (1941) ; SALMoND, LAW OF ToarS
61 (10th ed. 1945) ; see Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. Rav. 40, 47 (1915).
13. The fullest judicial discussion appears in Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501,
153 A. 457 (1931), 15 MixN. L. REv. 834, 79 U. Or PA. L. REv. 1153. Other cases are
Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 (1855); Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 130 N.W. 893
(1911) ; Hoyt v. Rosenberg, 182 P.2d 234 (Cal. App. 1947); ef. Harvey v. Cole, 1S9
Kan. 239, 153 P.2d 916 (1944) (child's conduct, whether as plaintiff or defendant, to be
judged in light of his age, experience, intelligence, and education "at least until he reaches
the later years of his minority").
14. Most of the commentators have taken this stand. See McCurdy, supra note 10.
So have the courts in the Charbonnean, Briese and Hoyt cases, supra note 13. Cf. RE.
STATEMENT, TORTS §283, comment e, and caveat (1934).
15. In Hill Transp. Co. v. Everett, 145 F.2d 746 (C.C.A. 1st 1944), the federal
court sitting in New Hampshire was upheld in refusing to apply the rule of the
Cluirbonnean case to a situation where a bus company was sought to be held vicariously
liable for the conduct of its 18 year old bus driver. "The only reason for applying a lower
standard of care when minors are concerned is to protect them from the normal conse-
quences of their immaturity, not to protect anyone else therefrom ... ." This reasoning
ignores the employer's right of recovery, over against the employee. But any objection
on that score would be pretty theoretical. See notes 24, 25 infra.
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authority and what there was involved what might be called play ac-
cidents rather than ones arising out of adult activities like driving a
car.16 This is surely a very strong indication that minors were seldom
sued, even when the stricter rule was thought to prevail-probably
because they seldom had enough property to make suit worth while.
This condition persisted through the early part of the motor vehicle
era, when age restrictions and tests for driving were more lax than they
are now. Today, of course, suits against minor automobile drivers are
common, although there is nothing to suggest that they are being more
widely sued than formerly in respect to their activities generally. The
reason for all this is not hard to find-minor auto drivers are increas-
ingly being covered by liability insurance. Now if that insurance were
to any considerable extent bought and paid for by minors, the total
picture would perhaps be changed but little, for the cost of their higher
accident rate would still be cast on minors as a group. But this is not
the case. A negligible amount of this insurance is paid for by minors. 17
Generally they are covered by reason of omnibus coverage clauses 13 in
policies held by others (most often, no doubt, by their parents). Who
then would pay any additional sum it might cost to hold infant drivers
to an adult standard? This would depend on the rating practices of
insurance companies. Until a few years ago no extra premium was
charged where the policy normally covered minor drivers (as members
of the named insured's family, etc.). The implication of this fact for
our question is clear-the cost of the extra hazard caused by the short-
comings of youth was borne by the insured motoring public generally.
That meant that any meaningful appraisal of the problem-whether
in terms of morals or expediency-would have considered not the pen-
alty or burden upon children (for that was non-existent) but rather
the extent to which the motoring public and its beneficiaries ought
to compensate those who are injured by the very serious ex\tra accident
hazard created by the youthful driver.
tLRecent changes in rating practices have altered this situation some-
16. The Charbonneau case, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931), was said to bring the
total to three. Note, 79 U. OF PA. L. Rmv. 1153, 1154 (1931). In England, the point
"seems never to have been decided," SALsmoND, LAW or ToRmS 61 (10th ed. 1945).
17. Letter of John J. Hart, Assistant Secretary, Travelers Insurance Co., to author,
dated Nov. 13, 1946.
18. These clauses extend coverage to "any person or organization legally responsible
for the use of the [automokile] provided [its] actual use is with the permission of the
named insured" (actual wording taken from Travelers Automobile policy). See SAvzn,
Aro Mo snE Lz.nnrr INsuRANcE 84 ct seq. (1936).
19. The extra hazard is a serious one. See LAWSHEr A Rzvmv or Tn Lrrzmrun
RIELATm To TH VARious PSYcHOLOGICAL AsPEcrs OF HIGHWAY SA= 32-3 (Purdue
University Research Bulletin No. 2, 1939). For example, "the fatality rate in terms
of miles for youths 16 years of age is about nine times as bad as it is for drivers aged
45 to 50 years!'
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what. A lower rate is now given to a policy-holder whose car is not
driven more than 7500 miles a year and who also has no one in his
family under 25 who regularly drives it. If a man fails to meet either
condition, he is charged a higher rate.2" Under this system the general
tendency would be to distribute the cost of the extra hazards of youth
(and note-not of minors only but of all drivers under 25) among their
parents. What this amounts to is pretty much the same thing that
would result from a universal vicarious liability of parents for the negli-
gent driving of young people (without any real right of recovery over
against the driver) and the real question is that of the extent to which
burdens should be placed on that relationship and distributed among
insured parents.21
What has been said incidentally throws light on the extent of legiti-
mate public interest in insurance practices such as these, since they
often determine the group among which some given aspect of tort
liability will be distributed, and this is a very serious policy determina-
tion indeed.
Another field in which it is believed reasoning has proceeded on an
altogether misleading and artificial basis is that of contribution among
tort-feasors. As I tried to show by a study I once made, the net effect
of the proposal for contribution would be to refine further the fault
principle at the cost of giving insurance companies and large self-
insurers the opportunity to shift some of their losses onto the shoulders
of uninsured individuals, so that a loss which had already been placed
in the channels of distribution would be again thrown on an individual
thus defeating pro tanto the social good that comes from the insurance
principle. 22 Somewhat the same thing is true in many situations where
subrogation is now permitted .23 It is also theoretically true of claims
for indemnity by those who have been held vicariously liable against
20. See note 17 supra; 40 BEST'S No. 5, p. 12 (1939).
21. So far as play accidents go, just about the same possibilities of loss distribution
exist through the modern Comprehensive Liability Policy. This was the case in Hoyt
v. Rosenberg, 182 P.2d 234 (Cal. App. 1947). Letter from Cyrus M. Munroe, Esq., of
San Diego, Cal., to the writer.
22. See James, Contributions Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Crificism, $4
HAv. L. Rxv. 1156 (1941).
23. See SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES & MATERUALS o ToRTs 125 (1942).
From the point of view urged in this article a somewhat similar problem was pre-
sented in an interesting recent case, United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 67 Sup.
Ct. 1064 (1947). Here a soldier was injured by defendant's negligence and the Govern-
ment sued defendant to get back money spent on the soldier's hospitalization and for his
pay during the time he was incapacitated because of his injury. Recovery was denied
because the question was thought to be a matter of federal fiscal policy determinable by
Congress, and Congress had refrained from providing any such remedy. Whatever
department of the Government decides this policy question should, I believe, consider the
fact that the Government is a far better agency to distribute losses than individuals or
most businesses.
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the individuals whose negligence has been the ground of recovery.
Fortunately such indemnity claims are practically never pursued by
employers against employees. 24 And in other relationships indemnity
claims are generally precluded by the practical effect of modern liability
policy provisions, where there is insurance..2 1
III
There is another way in which the fact of widely held insurance may
have affected the practical operation of tort law. One of the traditional
objectives of tort law has been to deter unreasonably dangerous conduct
and to promote the taking of reasonable precautions. 2 If an individual
actor must pay for the cost of his carelessness out of his own pocket,
the way in which this works is pretty plain to be seen. But how does
insurance affect this? In what types of situations, if any, does it dilute
the deterrent effect of liability upon the individual? Does this dilution
tend to foster irresponsibility, or are there countervailing forces brought
into play which promote accident prevention-perhaps even more than
the fear of individual liability would do? In this inquiry one thing
should be kept constantly in mind. Accident prevention is not the
only aim of tort law, and tort liability is not the only incentive to ac-
cident prevention. If anything leads to more adequate care of injured
people and their dependents, it may be justified on that ground alone.
Those aspects of tort law in operation which lead to the compensation
An excursion into the realm of futile fantasy is found in some of the opinions in
King v. Can. Pac. Ry., [1947] S.C.R. 185, where a somewhat similar problem wvas solved
by a resort to the metaphysics of proximate cause. Here the Government made payments
to an employee under the Government Employees Compensation Act. There was no
statutory subrogation, and suit was brought against the injuring third party on general
principles. Recovery was denied, most of the judges reasoning that the compensation
statute was an independent intervening cause. In sharp and refreshing contrast is the last
paragraph of the opinion by Rand, J: "One of the objects of the many forms of insurance
by way of compensation, pensions, etc., of these days is to ease the burden on the individual
of consequences attendant upon the increasing hazards of complex social and industrial
activities. But it would tend to reverse that policy to extend the established liability of
the individual for the benefit of these collective interests. Liability is necessary for the
essential standards of social conduct, but any enlargement of the field which in general
rule our legal experience has mapped out should come from the legislature and not the
courts.' Id. at 201.
24. Whoever heard of a railroad company's pursuing such a claim against its engineer,
for instance? Large companies certainly do not enforce such claims against their em-
ployees as a matter of general practice. There are, however, occasional instances where
claims of this kind have been pushed.
25. See note 18 supra. Under such a clause the insurance company would have
to defend and indemnify the very person against whom its claim for indemnity would be
pursued.
26. Thus it has been said, with only partial accuracy I think, "[t]he law of torts exists
for the purpose of preventing men from hurting one another... ." SALr.o:w, LAw ow
ToRts 13 (10th ed. 1945). See also id. at 18.
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and wide distribution of losses should be judged favorably, and ex-
tended, unless they actually bring about an increase in the accident
rate.27 What then are the factors in the present situation which make
for care or for carelessness?
In the first place it is obvious that fear of legal liability is not the
only thing that spurs a man on to be careful. There are many situa-
tions, for instance, where one's negligence is likely to bring physical
injury upon himself, as well as upon others. This is true of some of the
commonest cases, such as driving an automobile, where the individual
takes an active part in the situation at the time it is dangerous. In
other types of situations, to be sure, a man's negligent conduct carries
no real threat of bodily harm to himself either because of the nature
of the case or because the man is acting through an agent. And, of
course, a corporation cannot suffer this kind of injury. Even where
the fear of personal bodily harm is absent, however, there are incentives
to care. Accidents disrupt the normal processes of individual or busi-
ness life. They often destroy valuable property. They are apt to cost
money in collateral ways, quite apart from any question of possible
damages.29 They may create bad public relations, or bad labor rela-
tions. Sometimes they threaten injury to a member of the family, or
to a productive employee. And sometimes they involve the threat of
criminal liability. Then, too, the simply humanitarian impulses furnish
at least some people with a motive to take precautions for the safety
of others. Another thing should be noted. In situations of employment,
agency, and the like, there are usually two sets of incentives at work:
for the employer, those last mentioned; for the employee, the risk of
personal injury and also the fear of discipline for a job badly done."0
The factors referred to above operate quite independently of liability
27. This point of view is admirably set forth in BOwERs, COMPULSORY AUTOMOxBILE
INsuRAwcE 11-20, 110 et seq. (1929). Cf. PoLLocx, TORTS 47 Excursus A (14th ed,
1939).
28. There are many situations where a man has carelessly created or has failed to
remedy a dangerous condition (as in premises, machinery, products, etc.) which is far
more likely to be encountered by others than himself.
29. In his address before the Torts Round Table Conference at the meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, held in Chicago on December 28, 1946, Mr. J. E.
Brown, District Engineer of the Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., put the total estimated
economic loss from accident for the year 1945 at over $5,000,000,000. This included about
half a billion dollars from fire losses. The figures were compiled from estimates of the
National Safety Council and the National Bureau of Fire Underwriters.
It has been estimated that the "hidden" or "incidental" cost of accidents is four times
as high as the direct costs. Heinrich, Managemnent's Part in Safety, 40 BEsT's No. 10, p.
37 (1940).
30. It is not suggested that all the factors referred to in this paragraph have the
same force, or that they operate equally in all situations. Obviously that is not the cate.
But it is worth emphasizing that in nearly all cases there are strong reasons for careful-
ness quite apart from any question of liability.
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for civil damages. But the fear of such damages may afford some addi-
tional incentive to be careful, and the next questions are whether liabil-
ity insurance appreciably dilutes this effect and whether it promotes
or detracts from safety in other ways. The direct evidence on the first
point is worth little. No doubt the protection given by insurance makes
some individuals callous and every now and then a man will admit as
much in his own case. But no one has measured how widespread such
a reaction is. There are, however, certain facts which can be known
and which shed considerable light on the net effect which the institu-
tion of liability insurance has on the matter of accident prevention.
They are as follows:
1. Insurance has made direct contributions to the work of accident
prevention. The wide combination of risks has brought together large
aggregations of capital. This has put the insurance companies in a
strategic position effectively to carry out programs to promote safety.
They have done this both on an individual basis, and through such
organizations as the National Conservation Bureau of the Association
of Casualty and Surety Executives. Some such companies and organ-
izations have very extensive technical and engineering staffs which de-
vote all their time in well directed and expert efforts along this line.3'
31. In his address cited note 29 supra, Mr. Brown described in detail the organiza-
tion and functions of the Safety Engineering Department of a large insurance company.
The latter include research, inspection, and education. They are directed towards loss
prevention, loss minimization, risk selection, policy writing (i.e., development of factual
information relating to classifications, rating bases, loadingg and credits to enable under-
writers and agents properly to write a policy) ; premium charges, retention of business,
and development of new business (these last two, by giving and offering service, informa-
tion, etc., to insureds and prospects).
Air. Brown also described the organization and work of the National Conserva-
tion Bureau of the Association of Casualty & Surety Executives. This has five divisions,
viz: (1) industrial safety, (2) traffic engineering, (3) safety education, (4) special service
division, (5) information and library division. The activities of these divisions cover a
wide field and include the scientific study of accidents and formulation of safety rules and
standards, the promotion of safety education xith the general public, in the public schools,
and in such centers as that at New York University, where safety is taught to teachers.
The Bureau grants annual funds for scholarships at this center. It has also assisted in
preparing pamphlets and textbooks (such as '"Man and the Motor Car") which have kien
widely distributed. A similar description of the work of this Bureau may be found in
Murphy, Cooperation, 39 Bzv.s's 444 (1938). The functions and accomplishments of the
Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., are described in 46 BEsies No. 4, p. 37 (1945).
A sample of other references to the safety vork of companies and organizations is
as follows: 39 BsT's 564 (1938) (Nebraska and Oregon adopt safe driving courses in
high schools) ; id. at 968 (1939) ; 48 BEsr's No. 3, p. S0 (1947) (announcements of new
safety publications for wide public distribution) ; id. at 69 (1947) (reference to safety ad-
vertisements of one company) ; 47 BasT's No. 12, p. 35 (1947) (newv device for testing
drivers invented by one company); 43 BEs"s No. 3, p. 69 (1947) (article urging agents
to "improve [their] theater risk" by studying its fire and casualty hazards, with concrete
suggestions for their improvement) ; 47 BzsT's No. 11, p. 85 (1947) (describing coopera-
tion with President's Highway Safety Conference).
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This is the sort of service that only the largest industrial concerns could
perform at all effectively if they had to do it for themselves.3 2 It in-
cludes analysis of past accidents generally, and of specific current ac-
cidents to determine whether they disclose defects in supervision, equip-
ment, or in the habits or states of mind of workers. It also includes
inspection of equipment and survey of operations to discover in advance
defects, practices, personal factors and the like which are dangerous,
and the working out of devices, rules, and arrangements which will
minimize the danger. In some lines of insurance, the amount of money
spent on accident prevention exceeds the amount paid for losses.33
The insurance companies and organizations have also cooperated
actively with other groups engaged in safety promotion, and have con-
tributed materially to the education of the general public along this
line.3 4
2. Insurance companies can and do adjust their rates and select
their risks so as to furnish an incentive towards safety. Overall rates
in any field reflect overall losses. And the latter are, of course, very
much affected by the accident rate (among other factors)." Probably
there is a rather vague general realization of this relationship and it may
afford some slight motive to be careful, but the effect of any individual's
conduct on the general rate structure is so little, that the motive can
hardly be strong.
There are several ways, however, in which rating practices have re-
warded or penalized individual assureds for their own safety records.
32. In Steidle, Self Insuranwe for the Average Company, 46 BEST'S No. 1, p. 47
(1945) the author, Manager of the Insurance Department of the Bethlehem Steel Cor-
poration, stresses the engineering loss prevention service afforded by the insurance com-
pany as a factor seriously to be considered in deciding whether a company should be-
come a self-insurer.
33. In the case of the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co., for instance,
the ratio (for 1936-1945) of net losses incurred to underwriting income earned was 23.97%,
while the ratio of expenses incurred to underwriting income earned was 78.7%o. The
analogous ratios for a group of 100 casualty, surety, and miscellaneous companies were
45.6% and 46.9% respectively. The Spectator Property Insurance Review, June 13, 1946,
pp. 14-5 (hereinafter cited as Spectator). For the same company in 1937 the ratio
of losses paid to premiums written was 14.7%; the ratio of expense for inspections to
premiums written was 23.42%. 39 BEST'S 570, 571 (1938).
A recent 18% rise in elevator bodily injury liability rates reflects increases in inspec-
tion costs despite reductions in losses. 48 BasT's No. 2, p. 45 (1947).
34. See articles cited note 31 .rtpra.
35. Before the war, for example, declining accident rates in New York City over a
number of years led to progressively lower premiums for automobile liability insurance.
39 BE~s's 632 (1939). On the other hand the sharply rising automobile accident rate,
over the whole country, is one of the factors most stressed in connection with the rises in
rates since the war. See, for example, Spectator, June 13, 1946, p. 49; 47 BT's No. 11,
p. 17 (1947). In other fields, declining accident rates have been attended by premium re-
ductions for liability insurance. 48 BEsT's No. 2, p. 45 (1947). Cf. Sawyer, Compcnsa (ion
Rates and Safety, 42 BEST's No. 2, p. 47 (1941).
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Large risks are being increasingly written on an experience basis so that
the rate for each more or less reflects the loss e.perience encouitered on
that risk itself."8 And before the war there was in wide use one form or
another of a safe driver reward plan for individual automobile owners.?T
These have been pretty generally abandoned, largely it seems because
of the administrative difficulties they entailed.38 But in this and other
fields, companies do exert an influence for safety by rejecting risks
which have had bad experience or accepting them only at higher pre-
miums.09
3. Great strides toward safety have been made in many fields where
insurance is widely held. This is notably true in the case of elevators,
boilers and machinery. Here, as one writer puts it, "the [insurance]
rates have long been based largely upon the cost of accident preven-
tion. The result of that work is a degree of safety little short of phe-
nomenal." 40 And industrial accidents generally have sharply declined
in the course of a generation. During the first World War there were
in this country some 36,000 industrial fatalities a year. During the last
war, although output was stepped up as never before, annual industrial
deaths were held to about 17,000.4' In the field of aviation, some of the
pioneer safety work has been claimed by insurance companies. 42
Automobile accidents, on the other hand, continue to occur at an
alarming rate.41 Probably here, in the case of the individual car owner
36. The older method of adjusting premiums to the insured's efforts to.ards safety
was on the basis of physical equipment and condition of the plant. Brown, supra note 29.
More modern plans include the so-called guaranteed-cost and various kinds of retrosp-c-
tive rating methods. For descriptions of some of these, see 47 BEsT's No. 11, p. 29
(1947) ; id. No. 6, p. 25 (1946) ; 39 BEsT's 457 (1938).
37. See Sawyer, Frontiers of Liabilify Insurance, 39 BasS 439 (1938); Collins,
RatbW Problems, id. at 454; id. at 560 (preferred risk rating in New York). Cf. id. at
970 (1939) (describing intensive advertising campaign by National Bureau of Casualty
& Surety Underwriters on behalf of safe driver reward plans).
38. 43 BFST's No. 7, pp. 13-4 (1942). See also Blanchard, Compulsory Insurance in
Massachusetts, 3 LAw & CO-zTEP. PROB. 537 (1936). At least one company, however,
still offers a merit rating. See advertisement, Spectator, March 28, 1946, inside back cover.
39. J. E. Brown pointed out in his address, supra note 29, that one function of a com-
pany's safety engineering department is to select risks. See also 46 BEsr's No. 5, p. 31
(1945) (insurance has contributed to air safety by selections of risks) ; Spectator, Jan. 24,
1946, p. 10 (description of how undesirable auto liability risks are handled under the British
Columbia assigned risk plan). Cf. Blanchard, Compulsory Insuronec in Massaclusetts,
3 LAW & CoNTEMp. PROB. 537, 551 (1936). Interestingly enough the loss e%perience with
the assigned risks in New Hampshire has been "far better than on normal risks".
Rouillard, Experience in New Hampshire, 41 BEST's No. 11, p. 19, 76 (1941).
40. Sawyer, Retooling Casualty Insurance, 45 BES's No. 9, p. 37 (1945). See also
note 33 supra.
41. Hall, Everybody's Job, 47 BEsT's No. 11, p. 85, 96 (1947); ef. 39 BzsT's 749
(1939).
42. Perry, Aviation Insurance, 46 BssS No. 5, p. 31 (1945).
43. AccIDENT FActs (1946 ed.); Spectator, June 13, 1946, p. 49; 47 BEsr's No. 1,
p. 17 (1947).
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at any rate, the insurance companies have less effective leverage to
implement their safety campaigns than in the case of larger risks where
many operations are under the control of a single insured whose pre-
miums vary with his loss experience. 44 On the other hand, motor acci-
dent statistics contain no indication that the presence of insurance
makes accident rates go up. Indeed, accident records are better on the
whole in states where there is a relatively high proportion of insured
owners. 45
The foregoing facts point to the following "inferences: (a) in many
fields the practical operation of liability insurance has been definitely
to promote safety rather than foster carelessness, (b) in fields such as
automobile and personal liability insurance the insurance companies
have less effective means at their disposal to promote safety and their
success in doing so is less readily demonstrable. On the other hand,
there is no significant evidence to show that insurance protection leads
to increased carelessness. 46 And the insurance companies are engaging
in these fields too in efforts to promote safety which in the long run
44. In the case of fleet operations of motor vehicles, insurance companies have worked
out systems for driver selection and training, for safety incentive plans, for the selection
and maintenance of equipment, and the like. Brown, address, supra note 29. See also
Spottke, Truck Intsurance, 47 BEsT's No. 6, p. 25 (1946).
45. See SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES & MATmuALS ON TORTS 708 (1942), indicating
the relatively good record of Massachusetts for motor vehicle fatalities both before and
after the effective date of her compulsory insurance law. More recent statistics indicate
that the enviable Massachusetts record has continued. ACCIDENT FACTS (1946 ed.) shows
that for the period 1943 to 1945, only the District of Columbia and three states had a lower
fatality rate record than Massachusetts, id. at 61, while her relative standing for 1945
alone was even better, id. at 51. It is true that the reported non-fatal accidents showed an
increase after compulsory insurance. See, e.g., 40 BEST'S No. 7, p. 22 (1939). But there
is good reason to believe that this was only a paper increase caused by the more com-
plete reporting under the new law, and that the record of fatalities is a far more accurate
index of what happened. And of course the accident rate for the country as a whole
showed a marked increase during the decade after Massachusetts adopted compulsory
insurance. See ACCIDENT FACTS 62 (1946 ed.).
Another state where there was a marked increase in the proportion of insured cars
is New York. It is estimated that in 1942 only about 30% of her cars were insured, and
that this figure jumped to 75% in 1943 after passage of her Safety Responsibility Law
and is now higher. Veness, Safety Responsibility, 48 BEST'S No. 2, p. 37-8 (1947).
Thereafter, despite an increase in the number of accidents and of automobile registrations,
the fatality rate dropped to 8.4 per 100 million miles of vehicle travel, the first time ever
recorded under 10. Id. at 39.
In general the highest proportion of insured cars is to be found in the Middle Atlantic
and New England states. See SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES & MAT IALS ON TORTS 617,
618 (1942). And these states have among the most favorable motor vehicle fatality
records in the country. On the other hand a group of central north western states also
has a good accident record and a relatively low proportion of insured cars. AcciDrNT
FACTs 51 (1946 ed.).
46. The same conclusion is reached in Blanchard, Auto Insurance anid the Traffic
Problem, 40 BEsT's No. 3, p. 15 (1939).
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will probably have material effect. All in all, therefore, it is safe to
conclude that the benefits of social insurance which come even under
the present law through the operation of liability insurance are not
offset by any encouragement of irresponsibility. On the contrary, there
has probably been some concomitant net gain in accident prevention.
Moreover, there is no reason to expect any threat to safety from further
extensions of the insurance principle in the field of accidents.
IV
A third important effect which insurance has had on the practical
operation of tort law has been produced by the development of policy
coverage and of other provisions in the policy. To a limited extent
this has been brought about by statute, but in no small measure it has
come about through progressive business practices on the part of the
companies themselves. These developments have been along two lines:
they have increased the chances of compensation to the victim in cases
where someone is legally liable to him for damages; and they have
started to open up possibilities of compensation even where there is no
liability under existing rules of tort law.
Where the insured is a person legally liable, the fact of his insurance
against that legal liability has always, as a practical matter, increased
measurably the chances that any judgment or settlement agreement
would be satisfied. But the older type of policy was one of indemnity.
This meant that it was not available at all to the victim directly, and
that any legal liability under it was conditioned on fulfillment by the
insured of all conditions in the policy and discharge by him of legally
established liability for the injury. Thus it could be defeated by the
insured's bankruptcy, insolvency, or inability to pay, by fraud in his
application for insurance, or by his breach of the policy conditions.
And only the insured himself, for whose sole protection the insurance
contract was regarded as existing, could bring any legal compulsion to
bear upon the company. The possibilities of collusive abuse inherent
in this system led to legislative action in some states 7 Partly in re-
sponse to this, the standard policy of today has in all cases changed
this picture in a very material respect. This policy is an undertaking
to pay (within policy limits) the legally established liability of the
insured without regard to his having discharged it and in spite of his
financial inability to do so. Moreover the injured victim is given a
direct right of action against the insurer, once he has established the
insured's liability by judgment or agreement of all parties (including
of course the company). 4 Under this standard clause, however, the
47. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THR LAW OF INSURANCE 6S4-8 (1930); SAvn=a Auro-
mo nn. LiAxLrry INsURANcE 2-3 (1936) (pointing out that even under strict indemnity
policies, the claim practice of the companies had for years been the same as under those
agreeing "to pay").
48. SAwYER, AUTOmOBmE LIABmiY INSURANCZ Appendix A (1936).
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rights of the injured party are defeated if the insured fails to perform
the conditions of the policy.49 Some statutes have gone further and
have taken away or modified even such defenses. Thus the Massachu-
setts compulsory insurance law provides that no statement made by or
for the insured and no violation of the terms of the policy by him shall
defeat or avoid the rights of the accident victim against the insurance
company °0 And some financial responsibility laws have a similar pro-
vision.51
In many cases the actual tort-feasor has no substantial property and
has bought no insurance against his liability. Where that is so, com-
pensation for the victim depends on his being able to hold someone
else such as the maker or owner of machinery involved, the employer,
the parent, or an insurer who has come into the picture by contract.
Originally, liability insurance contracts covered only the legal liability
of the person who bought the policy.52 In the case supposed, therefore,
the injured person's chance of getting actual recovery was limited by
such doctrines as vicarious liability, negligence in making or maintain-
ing the machine, negligence in entrusting a machine to incompetent
persons, and the like. The law was not, however, altogether unrespon-
sive to the quest by accident victims of a financially responsible de-
fendent, and the limits of the doctrines just mentioned underwent some
expansion. There were significant judge-made developments. Starting
with the general rule that parents were not vicariously liable for the
torts of their children, the courts in this motor age of ours devised out of
curious fiction the family car doctrine 5l There was also an occasional
instance of liberal judicial presumption in cases of bailment.54 And at
least one court, without the aid of statute, was willing to hold the auto
owner for the negligence of any driver to .whom he had entrusted its
operation on the theory that it was a peculiarly dangerous instrumen-
tality.55 Moreover, there were many legislative extensions of vicarious
liability, the most far-reaching of which are statutes like those in New
York and California making the owner liable for the negligence of any-
49. For a list of conditions, see SAWYER, op. cit. supra note 48, at 294. Those prob-
ably most often called into play are the ones requiring notice of accident and notice of
suit, and that requiring the assistance and cooperation of the insured.
50. MASS. ANN. LAws, c. 175, § 113A (1942).
51. For example N.Y. Laws 1942, c. 249(i) (1); PA. STAT. Am., tit. 75, § 1277.21
(f) (1) (Purdon, Supp. 1946); cf. Travelers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Herman, 116 F.2d 151
(C.C.A. 8th 1940).
52. SAWYER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 84 (1936).
53. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 283 (1933) ; PRossE, ToRTs 500 (1941).
54. See authorities collected in SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES & MATERIALS 014
TORTS 673 n.20 (1942).
55. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); See
PRossER, ToRTs 447, 500 (1941).
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one operating a motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of
the owner."6
In large part, however, these doctrinal developments are frontiers of
the past. Some of the most important and widely held types of policies
cover as "additional insureds" many people who would be beyond all
but the most extravagant reaches of vicarious liability." Thus the
child who kicks his schoolmate across the aisle is himself protected by
his father's comprehensive personal liability policy. And the mere
borrower of a car is himself covered by the owner's insurance 1s (though
only the most advanced type of statute would make the owner liable).
And omnibus coverage clauses will probably be offered increasingly on
other types of risks. 9 Another provision which is becoming increasingly
popular has a similar tendency to extend the coverage of a single policy,
viz. the "drive other car" clause. As it is commonly written in auto-
mobile liability policies, this covers the named insured and spouse
while operating any other car.', Foreseeable future developments of
this clause are extensions of it to cover other members of the named
insured's household 61 and introductions of it into other fields.0 -
Still another development which also gives greater assurance of com-
pensation to accident victims is the fairly recent medical payments
provision. As now written in automobile liability policies, this provides
limited payments to injured occupants of the insured's car (or of an-
other car driven by the insured or spouse under a "drive other car"
clause) to cover medical or funeral expenses. Insurance companies are
introducing this kind of coverage widely throughout the liability field,"
and already, progressive insurance men are urging extension of it to
include all victims of an accident in which an insured or his car is
involved. 4 In a vital respect, this goes even further than anything
heretofore mentioned: it provides for payment without regard to fault.
56. CA. VEHICLE CODE 1943, § 402; N.Y. VEHIcE & Tn.Frnc LAw 1941, § 59.
57. Notably the automobile liability and the comprehensive personal liability policies.
58. See note 18 supra.
59. It is now being written, for example, on an optional basis, in products liability
insurance. 46 BEsr's No. 5, p. 70 (1945).
60. See, e.g. 40 BEsT's No. 2, p. 24 (1939).
61. 46 BEST'S No. 5, p. 2 7 (1945).
62. "Fly-other-plane" clauses are already being written. Spectator, Feb. 14, 1946,
p. 29.
63. Liability Revisions, 48 BEsT's No. 2, p. 45 (1947) (general revisions announced
by National Bureau of Casualty & Surety Underwriters, effective June 2, 1947, include
medical payments program applicable to all risks classified and rated in the omers'jand-
lords', & tenants' liability manual. Such coverage may also be written for manufacturers'
and contractors' liability, etc.); Spectator, Feb. 14, 1946, p. 29 (noting the writing of
such coverage in aircraft liability insurance).
64. Address of Alfred E. Spottke of the National Bureau of Casualty & Surety
Underwriters, at annual meeting of R.I. insurance agents, Providence, RI., Oct. 23, 1944.
The popularity with insurance men of this type of coverage is prompted in part
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This may indeed soon bring in a. limited absolute liability with assured
compensation in all accident cases where there is insurance.
The upshot of these developments in insurance policies may be
roughly summarized thus:
1. There is a tendency-which has in large part been realized-to
cover any driver of an insured car.
2. There is a tendency-at least partially realized-to cover members
of the insured's family no matter what car they drive.
3. A movement has gotten well under way to provide for limited
payments on account of medical expenses for accident victims,
where there is insurance-without any regard to fault.
4. There is a tendency-at least partially realized-to give accident
victims less qualified and more direct access to the insurance itself
(where there is legal liability).
V
The settlement practices of insurance companies constitute another
factor which has a great impact on the actual operation of tort law
today. The vast majority of accident claims never get into any stage
of litigation; only an infinitesimal proportion of them ever come to
trial. The "law" that directly governs the disposition of most tort
claims, then, consists in these practices. The legal rules affect most
cases only to the extent that they are reflected in the process of settle-
ment.
The results of the settlement process (and other aspects of compen-
sation for automobile accident victims) were studied under the auspices
of the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences
with the aid of the Yale Law School. An effort was made to get a fair
cross-section of personal injury cases, without any regard to questions
of fault or legal liability.6" On the point considered here, it was found
that some payment is made in about 85% of motor vehicle accident
cases involving personal injury or death, where there is insurance; that
where injuries are slight, payment on the whole is prompt and adequate,
but that both promptness and adequacy (from the point of view of
compensation alone, without regard to fault) declined with the serious-
ness of the loss.66 It is hard to tell in what proportion of automobile
accident cases there would be liability if an omniscient tribunal were
to apply the textbook rules of tort law with rigid disregard for popular
by public pressure towards social insurance in this field and the fear for "private insurance
if the state takes over any part of the compensation." Sawyer, Frontiers of Liability
Insurance, 39 BEsi's 439, 440 (1938).
65. The procedure was such that the committee conducting the study felt justified in
applying to the country at large the conclusions derived from its data. COLUMBIA REPORT
53.
66. COLumBIA REPoRT c. 5.
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prejudice or sociological trends. But it would certainly be far below
85%. The Committee on Insurance of the National Conference on
Street and Highway Safety, for instance, reported that 32.7% of these
accidents were caused by careless or reckless automobile driving; 29.3%
by a careless pedestrian; 18.7% by both parties jointly.' The conclu-
sion from all these facts is that, so far as the making of some payment
goes, there is a closer approach to absolute liability in practice than in
theory. In other words, wherever there is insurance there is to this
extent a closer approximation to the objectives of social insurance in
fact than the doctrines of tort law would lead one to suppose.
Several factors contribute to the result just described. Some of them
are altogether non-legal. To an insurance company any claim has a
nuisance value which is roughly measured by the amount of money it
would take to prepare the case for trial and defend it.c3 Moreover, it
is a matter of good public relations and salesmanship for a company
to settle claims and do it promptly." People who are already insured
do not want to be bothered with suit or any of the trouble it takes to
resist a claim, and claimants as a class include many prospective in-
surance buyers. Further, prompt disposition of claims enables the com-
pany to keep down the reserves for contingent liability it must carry on
its books.70
To the extent that the settlement of so high a proportion of claims
represents legal factors, it probably reflects for the most part broad
general trends in the law of torts, rather than specific rules of law.
Today between two-thirds and three-quarters of the jury verdicts in
tort cases are in favor of plaintiffs.7 1 That means that if a plaintiff can
67. REPoRT OF Commrrru ox IxsuRANcE NATioNAL CoN.-unrM.cs o: Srmrn &
HiGiWAy SAFETY 11 (1924). See also BowERs, ComsuLsorty AuTomonmz INStMANCE
73 (1929). In Accm=r FACTS (1946 ed.) are given tables showing an estimate of the
percentages of cases of various types in which there was a driver violation. These show
that drivers were not reported violating in about two-thirds of the cases involving injury
to a pedestrian. In other cases the proportion of driver violations w-as higher. Id. at
56-7. It is said that two out of every three pedestrians killed were either violating a
traffic law or committing an unsafe act. Id. at 59.
68. There are two schools of thought among insurance claim men as to whether
doubtful cases should be settled for their nuisance value, but certainly the practice of
settling on this basis is very extensive. Auto Liability Suits, 41 BEST's No. 5, p. 15
(1940) ; Sawyer, Casualty Insurance Litigation, 40 BEsT's No. 6, p. 21, at 71 (1939).
Sometimes the principle of the nuisance value has been used by insurance companies
in reverse, as by refusing to pay full compensation in small property damage cases (even
where there is clear liability) on the theory that few claimants 'will go to the trouble and
expense of pursuing such claims to get full damages for them. Many insurance men de-
plore such a practice. See Spectator, May 23, 1946, at p. 17; Van Orman, The Claim Man
and Public Relations, 47 BsT's No. 4, p. 19 (1946).
69. Ibid.; cf. Jainsen, The Claim Picture, 41 BEST's No. 10, p. 21 (1941).
70. See Sawyer, Casualty Insurance Litigation, 40 B-s-es No. 6, p. 21, at 70 (1939).
71. JUmCAL STATISrIcs OF THE WoRK OF THE Su-.mMM CoURe oF NEw Yor,
FIRST JUDICIAL Dm-r. (1930-1935) ; CLARK & SHULMAn, A STUDY OF LAw A% Dnus m-
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get his case to the jury, the chances are pretty heavily in favor of his
getting some recovery. To put it in claim parlance, any case that can
get to the jury has a settlement value. Probably, therefore, only those
legal rules which will effectively keep a case from going to the jury
play a dominant part in the settlement process. And the trend in tort
law during recent years has been very definitely away from such rules.72
When one turns from the fact of payment to the question of its ade-
quacy to cover losses, the picture changes. From its study the Colum-
bia committee came to this conclusion:
"To sum up, this analysis indicates that the payments do not in-
crease in proportion to the losses sustained; temporary disability
cases with small losses are considerably overpaid, those with larger
losses are slightly overpaid, while permanent disability cases of
earners-the class with the largest losses and greatest need-receive
just about enough to meet the losses incurred up to the time of in-
vestigation and get nothing to apply against the continued medical
expense or wage loss resulting from their impaired earning abil-ity." 73
This is a grave defect indeed in our present system, especially in the
eyes of those who accept the objectives of social insurance. It comes
largely from non-legal factors. As one writer puts it, "[a]t present the
economic consequences of motor-vehicle accidents are distributed, in
theory, on the basis of fault; in fact, on the basis of chance, trading,
and the relative resources of claimants, motorists, and insurance car-
riers." 14 Since most motor accident victims are from the lower income
groups they are as a class not in a strong bargaining position. To make
matters worse, the greater the injury, the loss and the need, the weaker
the victim's bargaining position becomes and the less able he is to wait
for the outcome of the tedious process of litigation. 7  As long as the
TION IN CONNECTICUT 74, 213 (1937) ; COLUMBIA Rz-oRT 90. Added significance is given
to the proportion by the fact that defendants try especially hard to settle cases where
liability is clear.
72. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW &
CoNmEMP. PROB. 476 (1936) ; Sean, Automobile Liability Law Development and Trend,
39 BEST'S 583 (1938) ; James, Accident Liability: Some Wartinie Developments, 55 YALE
L.J. 365 (1946).
73. COLUMBIA REPORT 92.
74. Blanchard, Auto Insurance & The Traffic Problem, 40 BEsT's No. 3, p. 15-6
(1939). The Columbia committee's conclusion was the same. COLUMBIA REPORT 200.
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matter of compensation is left to be fixed largely by bargaining, the
tendency will be for this fact to overshadow considerations of theoreti-
cal liability.76
CONCLUSION
The accident problem of our mechanical age calls for two things:
accident prevention and the compensation of the victims of accidents
that do happen. As for that branch of the law which is concerned with
civil damages or their equivalent, it is doubtful whether it contributes
very much to accident prevention. But if it does, that contribution
will not be diminished by further steps towards assurance of compensa-
tion and widespread distribution of the loss; indeed such changes-
or at least some of them-may well further the cause of safety. The
main job of accident law is, therefore, to promote the well-being of
accident victims if this can be done without imposing too great a social
cost in other directions. It is the writer's conclusion that a system of
social insurance can do this. The expressed doctrines of tort law are
not well adapted to such an end. They are horse and buggy rules in an
age of machinery; and they might well have gone to the scrap heap
some time ago had not the tremendous growth of liability insurance
and the progressive ingenuity of the companies made it possible to get
some of the benefits of social insurance under-or perhaps in spite of-
the legal rules. What we have as a result is only a partially satisfactory
solution. Many who cause accidents are still financially irresponsible
and not covered by insurance. Even where this is not the case, many
needy victims are still barred because of the fault principle, and many
others fail to get what they are legally entitled to under existing law,
because of the weakness of their bargaining positionY Even if the
supporters or one of two. Such a situation leaves little leeway for unforeseen emergencies.
The family doctor may wait, the landlord be generous, the grocer, up to his limited
means, give credit. But a nurse is not a capitalist and needs her wage at once, a
specialist is not the family doctor, the need for coal and light, medicine, special sick foods
and some unavoidable necessities of family living goes on. The result is that the families
most in need of compensation can often least afford to hold out for an adequate price,
i.e., a price commensurate with expenditure and as great as those who can afford to wait
might obtain." Corstvet, The Unconzpensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAw &
Coxmmn. PRoB. 466, 468 (1936).
76. It is true that progressive insurance men are urging a more liberal attitude to-
wards larger claims. See Spectator, May 23, 1946, p. 16; cf. Sawyer, Casualty Insurarce
Litigation, 40 BFesT's No. 6, p. 21, at 71 (1939) ; Van Orman, The Claim Man and Public
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77. The view has sometimes been taken that if the full sweep of modem negligence
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in Classification, 30 H~Av. L. Rev. 409, 414 (1917). That might conceivably be true
as between negligence and absolute liability as administered under the present law of
torts. But this glaring defect (mentioned in the text) in the present system shows a
wide discrepancy between it and a full scheme of compensation, or social insurance.
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present system improves, it is not likely to be permanent, but rather
to yield to a system of full social insurance with the government play-
ing a role at least as important as that which it plays in workmen's
compensation. The question of how long the present system will en-
dure is likely to depend on how progressive and far-sighted the insur-
ance companies are, and on the success of such legislative half-way
measures as compulsory insurance, financial responsibility laws, and
the like. While it does endure, no analysis or appraisal of tort problems
or tort law in the accident field can be really helpful unless it takes
full account of the fact and operation of liability insurance. The pres-
ent article is simply intended to suggest ways in which this may be
done.
